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IT SEEMS TO BE A GIVEN in the mine action
community that you are acknowledged as an "expert"
simply because you have stood up and declared it so.
As with many humanitarian pursuits, there is no process to credential, certify, or li cense individuals, processes, or procedures in mine action. There is no guild
or professional body to oversee and validate the veracity of performance claims. This is frustrating to
donors and funding o rganizations that have little
upon which to base outcome expectations. The answer is an open information system and process,
transparent reporting, and contributions from the
scientific community that are based on solid testing
and unbiased findings that tie performance to expected outcomes.
In this issue of the journal ofMine Action we have
solicited a variety of articles on manual deminers and
their personal protective gear. As you will see with
many of the articles, this segment of the community
seems to use basic information about what it can and
cannot do more than the other segments of the landmine community. Numbers are important. Decisions
are made from them. It seems, however, that information, though wanted by everyone, is shared by few.
Curious? Not when you consider the nature of the
mme action.
For example, where is this empirical support to
the preposterous claims accompanying mechanical
equipment releases and developments? Why don't the
mine detecting dog people publish the results of their
dog teams efforts in detail? Even those organizations
working with victims are reluctant to publicize numbers and data that support their level of effort. Colin
King once observed that "one of the greatest obstacles
to progress in mine action was peoples in-built reluctance to cooperate" and posited the concept of
"information non-cooperation." There are a variety
of reasons behind this such as:
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Sensitivity
In spite of the well-intentioned proclamations of
most groups and governments, many are sensitive to
reporting of casualty rates, number of deminer accidents, causes of accidents, and number of people receiving effective mine awareness education. Sometimes simple nationalism takes over and raw data is
frequently manipulated or held in order to either
minimize the appearance of incompetence or overstated to influence a more positive message. This reluctance to open organizational or governmental performance data is regrettable and leads to suspicions
that can be even more harmful and less productive.
Trust needs to be established between those owning
the data and those using and basing decisions on that
data.

Competition
NGOs competing for programs and for the
funding that goes with them, as well as commercial
companies competing for contracts, frequently view
the donor pool as a zero-sum entity in which giving
to one somehow takes away from another. The fear
of"donor fatigue" is, as of yet, unfounded as funded
programs seem to be bigger and bigger and donors
are still actively seeking solid, outcome-based proposals. Although the Canadian Mine Action Investment
database provided for UNMAS is a start, more donor information needs to be made public after tenders are awarded so that the mine action community
begins to feel there is plenty of work to go around
and funding to support that work.

Silver Bullet Syndrome
Research facilities protecting their inventions
and developments are the absolute worst at sharing
incremental achievements in technology fearing the
cross-flow will resulr in others capitalizing on their

work. Hopes for commercial exploitation of new
technologies (including patenting) is driving a considerable amount of useful information, technology,
and data underground waiting for some opportunity
to synthesize it and give it utility. It's like everyone
has a small piece of a jigsaw puzzle but no one wants
to connect their piece with anyone else so that the
picture ("answer") may be revealed to all. There will
never be a single technology that "does it all." Any
metaphorical silver bullet wi ll necessarily be a multisensor platform with a complex but reliable data integration and fusion routine. However, this will be
impossible to achieve as long as everyone sits on their
own little part of the solution.

The Politics of Ego
Personal and professional competitiveness is a
part of any discipline and this is no different. Without a clear distinction among professionals, their
worrh is built on their backgrounds and experiences
though they are frequently embellished because few
are the wiser. Few resumes and CV's receive the attention and scrutiny that they should because this
inflation offact permeates the industry in general. On
the brighter side, this is a small community and the
less capable and charlatans are known to most and
don't last long on the more significant projects. See

also, "Cowboy Chic. "

Donor/Corporate Expectations
Expectations of success are generally overstated
because of the inability to articulate clear and measurable goals and outcomes. The data required to
determine if goals have been met is rarely released
therefore comparing planned productivity of operations to the reality of demining o r mine action outcomes is difficult at best. Corporations also have an
expectation that off-the-shelf technologies unusable
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for other purposes can somehow be adapted to current demining needs which explains their inability to
produce widely useful tools and equipment.

Cowboy Chic
Information that could be used to benefit the
entire community is frequently held by the ex-patriots and international workers who feel that they have
the experience and expertise and don't feel like the
hordes of newcomers are worthy of their time. Some
have signed on with larger contracts that force them
to act like adults while others continue to claim an
absolute position of unquestionable authority based
on frighteningly little true experience. Some of these
are independent consultants who feel their "longevity" around land mines grant them some sort of right
to withhold data and information unless a sizeable
check accompanies the request.

Welfare
Less common, but typical of smaller NGOs who
have built long-term relationships with donors, are
situations in which agencies seeking to sustain longterm government fund ing (no incentive to complete
a program) are reluctant to pass information to anyone other than their benefactor. Some larger donors,
and even governments, have their "favorites" or
trusted agents to whom a disproportionate share of
tenders and contracts are awarded in this quasi-welfare system that keeps less-than-efficient actors on the
mine action stage.

Cost-Benefit Malady
A relatively new disease striking donors of large
sums is the paralyzing ability of under-funded and
poorly funded organizations to ask for a clear relationship berween dollars spent and outcomes p roduced. Governments are apparently stricken more

by Chris North
You never really think of religion.
It just doesn't go with this kind of work.
You just believe that most people are good.
But when we entered that village something changed my mind.
It was an idyllic setting, surrounded by hills and mountains of green.
But when those sights were seen, I realized then that this human race has a great
capacity for evil.
Where the desire to cause such pain comes from,
l don't know.
than others with the symptoms of the disease being
non-responsiveness and incoherent answers to relatively simple questions. The utility of the answers,
even if true and fonhcoming, are questionable but
there does, indeed, seem to be a chronic reluctance
on rhe part of governments to accurately account for
funds spent on mine acrion initiatives.

Uniformed Ubiquity
One rarely encoumers a land mine problem without encoumering the mili tary in some shape or form.
In some countries, the military are the exclusive owners of all clearance capacity and information. In others, military trainers and advisors pass along skills and
knowledge while lendin g considerable logistic and
communications support to clearance efforts. In spite
of everything militaries have to offer, there is a strong
propensity among all militaries to distrust civilian
institutions, especially aid agencies, and, as a consequence, withhold valuable and useful info rmation.
T his is ch anging albeit slowly as more integrated efforts occur and trust is built. Similar to the Silver
Bullet Syndrome above, military research and development results and outcomes are also classified and
withheld for years before emerging into the public
realm based on fears that new technologies in
councermine R&D would be challenged by an adversary. This may be particularly true in the sensor
area more than others.

Signatory Sickness
In one of the more perverse consequences of international cooperation, there seems to be a reluctance among signatories of the Ottawa Convention
to not share information with non-signatories of the
convention. In a self-defeating act of self-righteous
indignation, this refusal to both provide and share
useful information to organizati o ns attempting to

assist in mine action efforts is having the unintended
co nsequence of actually slowing progress and making the entire effort more costly thus killing or injuring more people that could have been saved. This
form of moralistic political partitioning is not only
harmful it's just plain silly.
In short, we see a common thread of"information = power" running through nearly all of these
which seems to typify the frustration and outlook of
many. Unless and umil there are more teaming arrangements, m ultilateral co ntract awards, partnerships and other trust-building measures taken that
emphasize co mparative advantages, this inability to
access simple common data for the greater good may
actually get worse before it gets better. The United
Nations and other large donors, particularly th rough
the Mine Action Support Gro up (MASG) an d other
like efforts, can play a great role in opening these
doors by encouraging through contracts and bilateral
relatio nships an open systems architecture for all mine
action data and information. Host country mine action centers (MACs), who have historically and un derstandably not programmed manpower for this,
can add functions to their staff that enhance their
ability to collect and disseminate information of wide
use ro a variety of people and organizations.
It's just data. It's not evil and it won't bite. As
this issue of the journal demonstrates, the PPE community is doing a decent job of getti ng good data out
to you, the consumer, on what you need to know to
make more informed choices. The job ahead of all of
us is too important to continue with practices that
are both petty and irrelevant to efforts to rid land of
mines and UXO. There are enough challenges and
obstacles facing all of us witho ut simple communication being the first casualty of any operation. Talk
to us and tell it like it is. T he objective, after all, is to
make the process better. Right? •

First we saw the mosque with its minaret fallen at a grotesque angle.
Who could do this?, I thought.
For what purpose to damage a place of worship.
If this was bad, how could 1cope with what was to follow?

Make sure there are no trip wires to catch you out.
Search each room slowly, carefully, systematically.
Where are the dangers?
Concentrate.
Don't be drawn to rhe body.
Are there mines in the rubble?
What will happen if I open this door?
Thank God, another room clear.
Now it's rime to go into the cellars.
l wonder where all the women and children are.
Did they get away?
As rhe cellar door is slowly, carefully opened a strange smell.
Sort of familiar and sweet.

The orders were to clear the mosque, so cautiously
we went inside.
Ir was easy--no bodies, no booby traps here.
Just a hand grenade on rhe Aoor.
Blow it up where it lies, the books say.
But you can't do that in a church, so carefully take
it outside.
1 remember thinking that to do this in a place of
worship, whether a church or mosque or
synagogue, a somehow terribly wrong:lf only I had known what was to come.
But nothing could prepare me for that.
In the briefing the night before we were told:
"You are to clear the village for rhe press .. .
Make sure rhar it's safe for them to 6lm .. .
They must show the rest of this world the destruction."
But still! wasn't prepared for what I would see.

Light enters from the doorway and our torches
we fi nd where the
women and children were hiding.
Cellars reinforced to protect them.
Sandbags and sacks of grain formed barricades.
A place of safety became their tragic tomb.

A Bosnian mine expert inspects the area where three Bosnian
children were killed in April 2000. The news oftheir deaths
made headlines worldwide. The circumstances were tragic-neighbors, medics, and de miners were powerless to help one
wounded little girl whose crying stopped before a saft lane could be
opened to her.
Phoro c/o AP/World \Vide Photo

As we moved into the village all was quiet.
All rhe young men were away fighting the war.
They thought rhat their homes and families were safe--the front line was miles
from their village.
And, anyway, the elders are there ro protect the wives and children.
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The first th ing I noticed in the village
-all the dead were old men.
They died where rhey fought, in the
srreets, in the gardens and houses.
They died protecting women and
children.
We moved amongst this savage scene
of death, checking each room and
each body for booby traps.
No joy in doing rhis rask well.
Check around and under each torso
and limb.

The atracking forces had Aooded rhe cellar with
fuel.
Women and children too scared to come out.
Died inside, some burnt to death.
Some had suffocated gasping their last breath.
Mothers died vainly trying to protect their children.
We moved amongst these bodies, each one
searched and checked for booby traps.
We moved showing no emotions, feeling numb.
We were professionals, we did our job well.

The village now safe for the press to come in.
The old men and the women nd children--we feel no more pain.
Now our pain starts.
Nothing can prepare you for his sore of job.
You do this work because you are dedicated, not because it is fun.
When we left the village I pr~
I can't remember praying before that day or since.
Then l cried real tears and real pain.
I've fought in wars and seen many of my friends die and never cried before.
But that day l cried.
I will never forget that day.
I still cry inside for those people.
I see them every day.
I have never prayed for rhem since that day,
But 1 have cried for them many times.

Reprinted by permission from Handicap International.
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